About me

I strongly believe to individual privacy and queer (LGBTQIA+ spectrum) rights as human rights. Besides, I believe to accountability, transparency and explainability for public entities and code.

Therefore, my main topics of interest in research meet these beliefs. I am interested to secure cryptographic protocols with a huge bestiary of security properties: verifiability, accountability, privacy, etc. To do so, I look at advanced cryptographic constructions, such as zero-knowledge proofs, and reduction techniques to handle them, such as rewinding.

To be as confident as possible, I work with formal methods techniques, mainly the Computationnaly Complete Symbolic Attacker (CCSA) model, to have benefits of automation coming from symbolic models while ensuring computational guarantees for security properties of cryptographic protocols. Moreover, I am really enthusiastic to look at proof modularity and composition to be able to prove more easily security properties on larger protocols.

Another benefit of using formal methods techniques is to try to build bridges with the cryptographic community towards concrete usages of cryptographic protocols.

Currently, I am a PhD Student of Université Paris-Saclay at the Laboratoire Méthodes Formelles (LMF), co-supervised by Caroline Fontaine and Guillaume Scerri. I am working on a formal proof of mixnets protocols, mostly used as a part of e-voting protocols. More precisely, I am working on two main mix-server protocols: one is from Terelius and Wikström and the other one is from Bayer and Groth.